in its major role in the formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, which through the cartelization of oil resources afforded member countries an organization to coordinate production to influence international prices. With the uptick in oil prices during the mid-1970s, the Venezuelans were again able to increase their share of economic rents through contract renegotiation. On the tails of OPEC came the establishment of the national Venezuelan oil company (la Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo). By developing technical ability and expertise in oil extraction, the Venezuelans were able to play a bigger role in upstream negotiations and put extra leverage on negotiations. 3 In 1973 the Acción Democrática government of Carlos Andrés Pérez nationalized the petroleum sector after taking power.
Chad has not been as successful as Venezuela at protecting the rents associated with natural resource extraction. It is a landlocked Saharan country with one of the lowest per capita income levels in Africa. It suffers major security problems from incursions on its borders with Sudan and Libya and substantial refugee influxes from the Darfur region. The country is universally considered a failed state with consistently some of the highest levels of corruption in the world. Nevertheless, the World Bank undertook an effort with a petroleum consortium in 1995 to begin to take advantage of the country's oil resources in an effort to reduce the drastic levels of poverty in the country.
Construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline to transport extracted oil from the Doba fields in Chad began in 2000, with oil flows beginning in 2004. The revenues accruing to the government were set up in such a way as to promote transparency and poverty reduction. 4 According to a Guardian article, the government's original take was 28 percent of the total value of oil, far smaller than that of other oil-producing countries in the region with comparably low scores on governance such as Equatorial Guinea, Angola, the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), and Gabon. 5 In addition, the consortium of foreign petroleum companies seems to have been able to negotiate contracts such that when national laws conflicted with any contracts, the contracts would supersede. In an attempt to renegotiate its contracts, the Chadian government spent $ 1.6 mil-150 Brookings Trade Forum: 2007 3. This was later followed by the 1967 Hydrocarbon Law, which also allowed the government to get improved concessions; see Mommer (1998) .
4. The issue of how and to what extent these petrodollars will promote development of Chad is an interesting issue, but one beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we will be concerned with the question of how bargaining over economic rents proceeded.
5. For various measures of "governance," see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) ; Political Risk Services (PRS) Group's International Country Risk Guide (www.prsgroup.com); Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (www.transparency.org/); World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/ notes.html). Xan Rice, "Fuels to Ourselves," Guardian Unlimited, September 1, 2006. lion on lawyers and consultants with the result being a mere 2 percent increase in the terms of the second contract. 6 As of late, Chad has not been the only case of extremely generous extraction concessions. A recent op-ed piece in the Boston Globe notes that "for a minimal return, [the Democratic Republic of the Congo] has signed away millions-if not billions-of dollars' worth of copper and cobalt for 35 years." 7 Even a leaked World Bank document cited in the article admits that "to allow the contracts to proceed without comment would put us in the difficult position of perceived complicity and/or tacit approval of them." 8 The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the terms of profit sharing vary widely across countries and over time. Between 1982 and 1999 , the share of rents going to host country governments in the natural resource extraction industries fell from 52.1 percent to 28.1 percent (see table 1 , panels b and c). This decline is driven by a reduction in tax collections and is consistent with the reforms in the mining sector reported by James Otto and others in a World Bank report.
9 According to the World Bank, competition to attract exploration and mining investment has intensified, which has resulted in more generous terms for investors. However, the share of rents paid to developed country governments averaged 40.1 percent while the share of rents paid to developing country governments averaged 31.9 percent. This differential is unlikely to be entirely explained by country risk. According to industry analysts, international financial institutions and the involvement of bilateral donors lessen the likelihood of expropriation and have significantly reduced the importance of country risk.
10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the cross-country variation in the distribution of rents is also likely to be a function of the host country's bargaining power vis-à-vis the multinational corporation.
To quantify the importance of bargaining strength on rent sharing, we develop an empirical framework based on Nash bargaining. Our economic measures of bargaining power include sunk costs, technical expertise of the host country, 8. le Carré and Stearns, "Getting Congo's Wealth to Its People." This is also not to imply that developed countries do not, sometimes, offer consortiums concessions that are perceived to be inequitable. As a recent New York Times article explains, "The United States offers some of the most lucrative incentives in the world to companies that drill for oil in publicly owned coastal waters." Furthermore, "a newly released study suggests that the government is getting very little for its money." Edmond L. Andrews, "Incentives on Oil Barely Help U.S., Study Suggests," New York Times, December 22, 2006, p. A1. 9. Otto and others (2006) . 10. Boulos (2003) .
number of competitors, and oil prices. We also seek to understand how the quality of governance, as measured by a number of governance indexes (see Data section for further discussion), and the development of institutions impact the negotiation process and, in turn, the outcome. Conventional wisdom holds that good governance produces desirable economic outcomes. For example, numerous studies document the link between the amount of foreign direct investment received by a country and the quality of governance infrastructure. 11 However, in the case of natural resource extraction, it may be that poor governance leads to higher corporate profitability and a smaller share of rents for the host country. For this we draw on the large literature on institutions from the past several decades using country-level governance measures to assess their impact on economic outcomes.
We find that the bargaining power of host governments and extraction companies does impact the relative distribution of rents. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the higher the quality of host country government institutions and the more democratic a government is, the better the government's deal ends up being. Although this may not seem like a highly surprising result, and anecdotal evidence has indicated this for some time, it is-to our knowledge-the first econometric attempt to investigate this relationship.
The importance of political and economic considerations for the outcome of the bargaining process is widely recognized but has not been systematically studied in this context. 12 Examining profit sharing between producing countries and oil companies in the Middle East, Edith Penrose noted that "the superior economic power of the oil companies arising from their ability to inflict a disastrous economic loss on the producing country does give them a bargaining position which holds down the share of the profits the producing country can obtain in the oil agreement." 13 However, she argued that reducing the monopoly power of oil companies would not likely be welfare improving, even for oil-exporting countries, given the increasing returns of the market.
More theoretical work has explored the structure and determinants of government take-sometimes referred to as the share of economic rent from extraction that goes to the government of the country in which the resource is located. Pedro van Meurs's text on petroleum economics lays some theory for defining government take, which is developed further by Morris Adelman who sought to model investment and returns along with risks over long-term oil investments.
14 David Newbery's work on industrial organization within the petroleum 152 Brookings Trade Forum: 2007 11. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) .
12. An exception would be Theodore Moran's 1974 study of bargaining over rents between copper companies and the Chilean government.
13. Penrose (1959 , 1960 ). 14. van Meurs (1981 Adelman (1991) .
industry was, in part, motivated by a desire to understand the dynamics behind cartelization, but his work also sketched out some ideas for understanding the nature of government take within this imperfectly competitive market.
15
Shang-Jin Wei has done considerable work looking at the "corruption premium" that firms pay to do business in countries with poor governance.
16 Using a matrix of data on foreign direct investment (FDI) that links fifteen source countries to roughly forty host countries, Wei demonstrated the taxing effect of corruption on FDI flows (as compared with taxes themselves). 17 The implication of this finding is that corruption will, in a sense, offset revenue collection as FDI flows adapt to corruption in much the same way as they would to a distortionary tax. In two follow-up papers, Wei (using the same dataset) and Beata Javorcik and Wei (using firm-level data) demonstrated how corruption changes the composition and volume of FDI flows entering countries with poor governance. 18 This research presents a relatively strong case for a negative correlation between government take and corruption, but there is no clear focus on what the relationship may be in natural resource extracting industries (nor is it evident whether these industries are included in the FDI or firm-level data). Given the more extensive (over time) and intensive nature of rent sharing negotiations in resource extraction, the nature of the trade-off between corruption and revenues warrants further investigation.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section formalizes Penrose's ideas into an empirical strategy based on a Nash bargaining framework. The third section describes the data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and our measures of rents and bargaining power. The fourth section provides the crosssection and time series evidence. The fifth section discusses some of the limitations of the analysis and directions for further research. The final section provides concluding remarks. Our appendix describes our data sources and construction in greater detail.
Bargaining over Rents
We formalize the bargaining process between multinationals and host country governments using a Nash bargaining framework. Total rents are given by:
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15. Newbery (1981 Newbery ( , 1992 . 16. Wei (2002) . 17. . 18. Wei (2000a) ; Javorcik and Wei (2000) .
where Q oil is the quantity of oil produced, P oil is the world price of oil, and C(Q) is the cost of producing a given quantity of oil. In our empirical work, we make the distinction between operating costs and sunk costs, which consist primarily of research and development expenditures. Let the outside options for a multinational (multinational corporation or MNC) and host country government be given by π * MNC and π * G , respectively. 19 The outside options for the multinational are defined by the opportunities that are available in other countries while the outside options for the government are defined by what the government could earn if it were to operate the company itself. The bargaining strengths of the two parties are denoted by α and (1 -α) for the government and the multinational, respectively. While the two parties' respective bargaining strengths are partially determined by outside options, they may also be influenced by institutional factors not specific to the particular project at hand. For example, Penrose talked about the importance of popular opinion in shaping a government's ultimate bargaining position.
20
The outcome of this bargaining process is determined as the solution to maximizing-over π G and π MNC -the following:
This yields the following solution for government rents:
which, for the purposes of the empirical work, we rewrite in the following way:
Three factors influence the share of rents going to the host country: the relative bargaining strength of the government π, the outside options available to the government π * G , and the outside options available to the multinational π * MNC . Our empirical investigation is guided by the solution to the bargaining game. In particular, we estimate the following equation:
The dependent variable, R Git , is government take, the share of rents going to the government. We are able to measure this variable directly as the ratio of taxes, royalties, and government profits to total profits generated by the project. The impact of the government's bargaining strength relative to that of the multinational on the share of rents going to the government is measured by β 1 , which we expect to be positive. The measure of the impact of the multinational's outside options is β 2 , and its expected sign is negative. And the measure of the impact of the government's outside options on the share of rents going to the government is β 3 , and its expected sign is positive.
We turn now to a description of the data and our proxies for bargaining power and outside options.
The BEA Data
We analyze firm-level surveys on U.S. direct investment abroad, which are collected each year by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The BEA requires that U.S.-based multinationals disclose on a confidential basis balance sheet-type data about their overseas activities. In our analysis, a U.S.-based multinational is defined as the combination of a single U.S. entity that has made the direct investment, called "the parent," and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the "foreign affiliate." We use the data collected on majority-owned, nonbank foreign affiliates and nonbank U.S. parents for the benchmark years between 1982 and 1999, which are 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 and include more comprehensive information than the annual surveys.
While our choice of benchmark years has been dependent on the availability of BEA's survey data, it seems important to note that the beginning of our panel data series follows five years after the enactment of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977, which requires any company that has publicly traded stock to "maintain records that accurately and fairly represent its transactions" and which make it "unlawful for a U.S. person to make payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with any person." 21 In effect, our data are, therefore, coming from the era of FCPA enactment and may reflect less corruption than a sample taken from the period before (or shortly after) 1977.
Creating a panel using the benchmark years of the BEA survey data requires a number of adjustments. First, not all firms are required to report to the BEA, and reporting requirements vary across years. Second, because we are interested in understanding what is happening at the industry level, we must consider the implications of the changes to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in 1972 and 1987 and the switch from SIC codes to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes in 1999. And finally, the fact that parents are allowed to consolidate information for several affiliates in one country on a single form calls for special care in the aggregation and interpretation of affiliate-level data.
All foreign affiliates with sales, assets, or net income in excess of a certain amount in absolute value must report to the BEA. This amount was $3 million in 1982, 1989, and 1994 , and it jumped to $7 million in 1999. In addition, a new reporting requirement was imposed on parents in 1999. Parents whose sales, assets, or net income exceeded $100 million (in absolute value) were required to provide more extensive information than were parents whose sales, assets, or net income fell below $100 million. To determine whether the changes in reporting requirements biased our sample toward small firms in the early years, we imposed a double filter on the data based on the 1999 requirements, using a constant dollar cutoff for affiliates of $5.59 million and $79.87 million for parents, both in 1982 U.S. dollars. 22 As it turns out, the reporting requirements were large enough that imposing the filter on the data made little difference.
To focus our analysis on the subset of resource-extracting foreign affiliates, our sample only includes affiliates classified before 1999 as "Mining or Oil and Gas Extraction" (SIC87 codes 10-14) and in 1999 as "Oil and Gas Extraction" (NAICS97 code 211) and "Mining" (NAICS97 code 212).
Key Variables
Our analysis looks at several variables that include government share of rents, bargaining power of the government and of the multinational, and the outside options of the government and of the multinational.
Government Share of Rents
We define this variable as the sum of all direct payments to the government as a result of the project, divided by income net of operating costs. In practice, government take on extraction projects can take a number of different forms. Very generally, the systems of government take can be divided into royalty payment, taxation, and profit sharing. Any given investment may be subject to one or more of these transfers as stipulated by contract, and the government's revenue profile and share of risk will certainly depend on the type of system that is in place.
For our purposes, we define payments to the government as taxes (income and other), royalty payments, and profits earned by the government as a result of profit sharing agreements. The dataset does not make a clear distinction between payments to the national government (versus payments to regional or local governments), but given the national importance that most oil investments have, in addition to the scale of revenues that are realized, it seems reasonable to assume that these payments accrue solely to the national government. Our measurement of profit sharing is an admittedly imperfect one, but profit sharing is often a major share of government take in extraction contracts, so it is important to include even an imperfect control. The BEA's survey of U.S. direct investment abroad provides information on what share of a foreign affiliate's equity is held by a foreign owner. Assuming that this foreign owner is, at least in most instances, the host country government, we then multiply this percentage by the affiliate's net income to get a rough estimate of profits accruing to the host country. Table 1 reports the trends in the government share of rents across regions and over time. We also report separately the share of rents earned from taxes, royalty payments, and profit sharing. A number of things stand out: for all regions and as a whole, the share of total rents going to the host country has decreased from 1982 to 1999. The decline has been most dramatic in Europe and Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. This fact poses an intriguing entry point for our discussion: Why did government take fall so dramatically during this period from 1982 to 1999 in two of the world's most politically tumultuous regions (excluding Europe itself, that is)? Also, why in 1999 was government take in developed countries almost twice that in sub-Saharan Africa? Finally, looking at the breakdown of the different types of transfers, we can see that taxes make up the largest chunk of government take but that the relative size of profit sharing and royalty payments compared with taxes varies from region to region.
Bargaining Power
The bargaining power of the government is affected by a host of countryspecific institutional factors. One factor is the government's accountability to its people, which is likely to influence its bargaining power. In a country in which the outcome of negotiations is more transparent, the government will feel more pressure to push for a better deal. In an extreme case, the government's threat point under high transparency is determined by the possibility of civil unrest and subsequent plant closure. Thus the country must balance the revenue it stands to lose if it takes too tough a stance with the possibility of political upheaval. We measure the level of accountability to the people using two subjective measures: democracy and voice and accountability. A second factor is political risk, that is, the risk of political factors resulting in loss or diminished return on investment. High political risk increases the likelihood a. South Asia is included in the totals but is not listed separately since it was not part of the sample in 1982 and currently represents only 0.28 percent of the observations. of disruption of a project, thereby increasing political risk and decreasing the government's bargaining power. Therefore it should not be surprising that firms require a higher share of a project's total benefits in developing countries, where political risks are greater. We measure political risk using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index since it is the only measure available that dates back to 1982.
Our measure of government accountability to the people is determined by using a rating of the country's level of democracy, which is based on two categories taken from the annual survey conducted by Freedom House. Freedom House publishes information on civil liberties and political rights separately. Since these two variables are highly correlated, we follow Helliwell and combine the two ratings into a single index, democracy, that ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating greater democracy. 23 In the Freedom House survey, ratings of civil liberties (civlib) and political rights (prights) can range between 1 and 7; we transform these into a single variable that ranges between 0 and 1 (with higher values indicating greater democracy) using the transformation (14 -civlib -prights) / 12. Data for these two categories and thus for this composite variable of democracy have been collected since 1970. As a check for robustness of our measure of democracy, we also use the subcomponent of the ICRG political risk index that measures democratic accountability. We expect that the level of corruption will influence the outcome of the bargaining process-in more corrupt environments, multinationals may be able to strike a better deal. A third factor is corruption. Our measure of corruption is based on ICRG's corruption component of political risk. And finally, the government's bargaining power is directly a function of the technical expertise of its bureaucrats in operating natural resource extraction independently without the help of a private company; our measurement of the quality of the bureaucracy in the regions studied is based on ICRG's the bureaucratic quality component of political risk.
We measure the bargaining power of the multinational vis-à-vis the host government in two ways. We assume that the amount of competition from similar firms in that same market reduces a given multinational's bargaining power. If there are more firms in the consortium, the host government would be in a better position to bid up its own take, despite any collusion among the competing firms that may occur. Therefore, we set the bargaining power of the multinational as n, the number of U.S. multinationals in the market in a given country and year. An increase in n weakens the bargaining power of any given multinational in the country. Following Raymond Vernon's obsolescing bargaining model, we also include in our measurement of the multinational's bargaining power the ratio of sunk costs to total costs of production. 24 The greater the share of sunk costs a firm has paid, the more it is "stuck" with its investment, the more costly expropriation would be, and the more likely it is for the firm to concede to terms that are less profitable for itself. We define sunk costs as the firm's expenditure on exploration and development-namely, how much it has spent in a country's oil fields to find oil plus the cost of investment in property for constructing a plant and equipment, and we normalize this variable by dividing by total costs of production to obtain the ratio of sunk costs to total costs. Both an increased share of sunk costs and a greater n are associated with lower bargaining power for MNCs.
outside options. The host country's alternative to agreeing to a deal with the consortium of extraction firms is largely determined by the government's capacity to run the oil company without the multinational. This in turn is a function of the technical knowledge of its labor force. We establish a proxy for this aspect of bargaining power by using the share of employees working in the foreign affiliate that are local citizens. We justify the proxy with the following logic: the ultimate threat point for a national government in negotiations with a consortium of extraction firms is nationalization, that is, seizure of the means of production and therefore the entire investment. In so doing, the country must balance the increased revenues it gains from complete ownership (of production and assets) with the decrease in revenues from being a less efficient operator of the extraction process than the private companies. In extremely underdeveloped countries, it may be the case that almost all of the skilled employees of the operation are foreign, in which case the national government will not be able to run the operation at all, and therefore it has a relatively low threat point and limited outside options. 25 For the multinational, the alternative to investing in a particular country is what the firm could make if it shut down operations and relocated to another country. The costs associated with doing this are-to some extent-already captured in the ratio of sunk costs to total costs of production. The potential benefits of relocating to another country are the profits the multinational could make in another country relative to the profits it stands to make if it stays put. To measure this, we first compute the firm's profit margin as the ratio of net income to costs of production. The profit margin is then normalized by the average profit margin across all firms operating in the same sector in a given year 160 Brookings Trade Forum: 2007 24. Vernon (1971) . 25. Granted not all of the foreign skilled employees running the operations of a U.S. multinational abroad may be U.S. citizens-they could be skilled citizens of other nations-but we believe, nonetheless, that it is a reasonable estimate that most are U.S. citizens. by subtracting from the firm's profit margin the industry average. Increases in this variable can be interpreted as lowering the multinational's threat point in a bargaining situation.
the price of oil. We include as a regressor the real price of crude oil, which is meant to capture the fact that tax and royalty payments are often tied to prices. For example, following the first oil shock in the 1970s, the government of Alberta in Canada refined its royalty formula to make it sensitive to price changes.
26
This type of provision is also common in the mining industry. 27 For the sake of completeness, we should also include in our regressions the prices of all other minerals. However, with the exception of oil, data limitations make it impossible for us to know exactly which mineral is being extracted by the firms in our sample. Nonetheless, to the extent that oil prices are demand driven, movements in the price of oil will capture movements in other minerals prices. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. As discussed earlier, the first four variables are measures of government take (the dependent variable) and vary between 0 and 1. The standard deviations for all four of these variables are large (and the variation is especially noteworthythough smaller than that for taxes-for royalties and profits, which, on average, make up a small amount of total government take). This provides us with a great deal of variation in our dependent variable (which is to say, there is "noise" in the regressions), which is less than desirable. We previously described the ratio of sunk costs to total costs and competition, which are proxies for MNC bargaining power, and the government's ability to run the business (that is, the inverse of the share of U.S. citizens employed), which is a proxy for the host government's bargaining power. "Nonoperational" takes a value of 1 if the plant was strictly in the exploration stage and so not extracting material: 6.5 percent of the observations are classified as nonoperational.
Results

Fixed Effects Regressions
We estimate equation 3 using a fixed effects regression to remove timeinvariant, firm-specific characteristics that would bias our estimation of the effect of our institutional variables on government take. This procedure decreases the variation in our institutional variables considerably but does not appear to dramatically change our results relative to the ordinary least squares regressions we have run. In table 3, regression 1 shows that an increase in the ratio of sunk costs to total costs results in an increase in government take of 0.056. The other limitation to an oil company's bargaining power, competition, results in a 0.019 increase in government take. An increase of 0.01 in the share of nationals employed by the multinational (which is a proxy for the government ability to run the business) results in a 0.001 increase in the government take. A US$1 increase in crude oil prices results in an increase of government take of 0.006, which confirms the prevalence of contracts that tie host country benefits to prices. An increase in the profit margin of an MNC's project relative to its projects in other countries increases government take by 0.278. We interpret this result as evidence that the multinational is more willing to concede to generous terms when a project is exceptionally profitable. Finally, an affiliate that is nonoperational decreases government take by 0.096. This latter result is consistent with the fact that firms do not pay taxes until they are operational. All of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, and the regression R squared is 0.23, an indication that our regressors have significant explanatory power. When we add political risk to the regression, the coefficient is 0.014 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Since political risk varies from 0 to 6 with 6 being the least risky, this result implies that government take varies 1 for 1 with political risk. 28 The ICRG measures of institutional quality (democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality, and level of corruption) all have roughly the same positive effect on government take and are all statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. When these institutional variables are added, the coefficients and standard errors on the other regressors are largely unaffected. The coefficient on democracy is positive but statistically insignificant so that-at least as measured-there does not appear to be a strong association between political rights and civil liberties and government take.
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28. For a description of the academic dataset, see Knack and Keefer (1995) . Source: Authors' calculations. MNC = multinational corporation. *Significant at the 5 percent level; **significant at the 1 percent level. a. The absolute value of the t statistic is in parentheses.
The fact that democratic accountability and democracy yield different results suggests that the two variables are measuring different things. Indeed, democratic accountability as measured by ICRG appears to capture political stability rather than accountability to the people per se. Turning to table 4, which uses government take from taxes as the dependent variable, we see that the results are largely the same as with total benefits, but with slightly different magnitudes. Government ability doubles in magnitude compared with the previous regressions, while the magnitude of the multinational's relative profitability falls by about a third. One explanation for these changes is that government ability is known ahead of time, and so it impacts the overall tax deal a firm gets up front, while the firm's in-country profitabil- ity relative to other projects only becomes known over time. Thus some of the concessions associated with relative profitability may be more closely tied to royalties or profit sharing or both. The magnitudes and significance of the institutional variables are largely unchanged with the exception of democracy, which is now significant at the 5 percent level. This may be because tax rates are typically public knowledge while royalties and profit sharing agreements tend to be private knowledge. The results for the variable democracy in table 5 support the hypothesis that democracy is not a significant predictor of the host country share of benefits from profits.
In table 5, when we look at the results for government take from profit sharing regressed on our set of explanatory variables, the coefficients are generally of smaller magnitude and less statistically significant. The impact of the share of sunk costs on government take is much smaller at 0.016 and only marginally significant. Competition, the MNC's relative profits, the nonoperational dummy, and all of our institutional variables are not statistically significant. Government ability remains statistically significant but only at the 5 percent level and with a miniscule coefficient. The sign on the price of oil changes, indicating that a US$ 1 increase in the price of oil reduces the host country share of benefits from profits by 0.001. Since taxes and royalties tend to rise with oil prices, this result implies that profit sharing agreements have become less favorable to host countries as oil prices have increased. However, the R squared for these regressions is far smaller than for that in tables 3 and 4. The relatively small share of government take from profits and the smaller variance that we observed in the summary statistics may result in there being dramatically less "signal" for all the "noise" in our data and may disguise any actual significant results. Moreover, it seems a bit ill advised to conclude from these results that these standard explanations do not affect profit sharing behavior.
Discussion and Conclusion
The basic multivariate regressions presented here demonstrate preliminary evidence that the bargaining power of host governments and extraction companies can impact the relative distribution of rents. Moreover, we find an indication that the higher the quality of government institutions and the more democratic and accountable a host country government is, the better the government's take of rents is. Our work represents the first generalized econometric attempt to look at bargaining power in natural resource extraction. The implication of our findings is that, on average, poor countries keep a smaller share of the rents from natural resource extraction compared with the share kept by rich countries. Although the World Bank has been extensively involved in some of these negotiations, the cases of Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo suggest that it has not been very effective at protecting host country rents. In addition, this paper provides systematic empirical evidence in support of Vernon's classic theory of the obsolescing bargain. As the ratio of sunk costs to total costs increases, the multinational's share of rents declines.
Whether the relationship between governance and government take we have uncovered is attributable to better governance, meaning lower political risk and thus a smaller demanded risk premium for firms, or whether it is a result of more capable governments being able (or willing) to negotiate better deals for their citizens is unclear and warrants further investigation. We know from Wei and others that risk matters, but could bargaining power matter as much too?
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In addition, any correlation between countries that have nationalized a resource extraction industry and the country's level of governance could bias our estimates. A more thorough investigation of nationalized industries and country governance would be useful for further understanding the relationship between bargaining power and rent sharing. In particular, a more thorough inquiry into the nature and variation of rent sharing methods (for example, taxes; production sharing-that is, the host country government getting a share of the raw materials extracted; profit sharing; and royalties) and the distinction between costs of doing business related to rent sharing versus those related to corruption would advance this field of research substantially. Although the relation between rates of return and governance has been better understood in manufacturing industries and in aggregate, the more complicated relationship that occurs in the resource extraction industries certainly warrants as much, if not more, understanding, if only because of its profound effect on how the natural wealth of nations is utilized.
dence that host country corruption reduces the volume of inward FDI and, for foreign firms in high tech industries, creates a bias in favor of sole ownership. 4 The literature in this field, which includes other papers that I have not cited here, by and large suggests that corruption tends to add risk for international direct investors, and therefore those investors need to be compensated for investing in relatively corrupt countries.
Following the methodology in my paper in Review of Economics and Statistics, one can check how much tax and how much host country corruption discourages FDI. 5 The ratio of the two would allow one to estimate a corruption premium in units of tax equivalent. Armed with that estimate, one can then ask in the natural resource sector how much a developing country government with a certain level of corruption needs to reduce its take to compensate foreign investors. This gives an estimate of an "appropriate level of government take" that adjusts for the corruption risk in the country. One can compare this "appropriate level" with the actual government take in the data.
Finding Exogenous Variations in the Bargaining Power of the Multinationals
I have another suggestion. Perhaps the authors can also explore other exogenous variations in multinational firms' bargaining power. In particular, there are two events in 1979 and 1999 that can be useful in this context. I understand that the authors only worked with data from 1982 to 1999, but the sample could be expanded to encompass the first benchmark survey in 1977 and the more recent 2004 benchmark survey.
What happened in 1979? During the Carter administration, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that prohibits U.S. multinational firms from offering bribes to foreign government officials. None of the other major FDI source countries had such laws at that time. This event potentially altered the bargaining power of U.S. companies compared with that of multinational firms from other countries.
In 1999, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, after two decades of pressure from the U.S. State and Treasury departments, finally enacted a treaty outlawing bribery of foreign government officials by firms from all the signatory countries. In this case, the previous asymmetry between U.S. and non-U.S. multinational firms was removed. The timing of rectification, however, differed across the signatory countries.
These two events are arguably exogenous from the point of view of any individual company and individual government. Therefore, they offer researchers opportunities to check how a change in the bargaining power of multinational firms affects the government take in the natural resource sector.
Discussion: Laura Alfaro opened the general discussion with two brief comments. First, regarding data and empirics, she remarked that it was somewhat confusing that the variables moved very little over twenty years, with the exception of accountability. Second, Alfaro pointed out that fragile states have difficulties in bargaining and that corruption presents itself in many forms. U.S. companies have the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that governs the ways in which they conduct business; however, U.S companies do find loopholes to circumvent this. Last, Alfaro commented on the uncertainty of how much corruption is changing because it seems that one cannot be in the oil business without conducting some of these practices.
Beata Javorcik raised three points. First, there is an alternative explanation regarding fragile states being worse bargainers. States that are concerned about their independence may want to give oil companies more lucrative contracts, so that they can create incentives in powerful Western governments to support their independence. Second, these contracts are not only about profit sharing. There is the issue of who pays for infrastructure; it is not just that one needs to build a pipeline, the actual exploration site or activity has to be built as well. Therefore, if the local government is paying for the infrastructure, then they may be getting a higher share. She added that it is important to look at the contracts to understand both components and then to look at the relationship. Javorcik concluded by highlighting Assaf Razin's presentation the day before and the issue of selectivity. The nature of the data is such that only countries with profit sharing agreements are analyzed, which excludes countries that have their own extractive industries. Last, she suggested examining further the direction of causality and offered an example to highlight this point: if a country invites a multinational to help extract resources and they offer a bribe, the country may want to become less transparent, so that its citizens do not know where the money is going.
Theodore Moran applauded the paper and its contributions. He agreed that additional work may be needed but commended the literature review and data on the benefits that come in extractive industries. He suggested finding a way to get data on how capital and how much capital is invested, so that one can get figures on return on investment. In his opinion, this would be highly valuable information.
Raymond Mataloni commented that he had issues with the deep-end variables in the regression, specifically using net income as a denominator. To get better results, he suggested using sales or total revenues as a denominator. Also, he remarked that it was unclear where one can collect information on government ownership share, which is probably not available in the data.
Regarding dynamics, Deborah Swenson was concerned about the dynamics game being played out and offered a suggestion. If one plays too hard at the outset, although a very high share of the rents may be taken now as a result, it is going to come at the expense of not getting the needed investments that will allow one to have higher growth in future years. In addition, she suggested looking at lagging the institutional variables, because although there may not be a lot of variation, it is nonetheless important. She pointed out that to the extent that the returns in the oil industry are very much dependent on the price of oil and capacity at different times, may be reason for dynamic differences.
Susan Collins offered a couple of comments. She noted that the data used, especially on a comparative basis, make it difficult to determine which domestic investments in extractive industries are local. Concerning corruption, Collins stated if one thinks there is a corruption risk premium, presumably in a given country, there are differences across industries, but there has to be a countryspecific effect that is important. Collins reiterated a comment made earlier on providing additional information on the nature of the panel being used. This would be helpful because the cross section aspects of it may be behaving differently from what is going on within countries over time.
Margaret McMillan concluded by offering a few brief responses to questions and comments raised by participants. She thanked participants for their suggestions and feedback, which will help take this research even further. She agreed a better job of describing the data is needed and acknowledged that the dynamics component of the paper is a weakness that needs improving. Regarding this, McMillan went on to note that big changes across countries over time are driven by taxes. We know profit sharing of some sort is going on and the only way to measure it with data from BEA is by information on ownership.
